The NSA's 2026 Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines assume devices can prove cryptographic identity, but most enterprises still rely on spoofable identifiers like MAC addresses, MDM enrollment, and SCEP-issued certificates. These portable credentials can be copied or replayed, making true device verification impossible. Hardware security modules (TPM, Secure Enclave, Android hardware-backed keystores) solve this by generating non-exportable private keys. ACME Device Attestation (ACME-DA), an emerging IETF standard co-developed by Smallstep and Google, extends the ACME protocol with hardware attestation challenges, replacing SCEP's shared-password model with cryptographic proof that a certificate key is bound to a specific physical device. This enables continuous, hardware-rooted device authentication across Wi-Fi, VPN, SaaS, SSH, and internal services.

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Zero Trust Has a Device Identity Problem. The NSA's New Guidelines Make It Clear.User Identity Is Solved. Device Identity Is Not.Why Legacy Device Identity Falls ShortHardware-Attested Device IdentityACME Device Attestation: The Emerging StandardWhat This Looks Like in PracticeZero Trust Requires Identity Everywhere

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