A new wave of the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm has compromised dozens of packages in Alibaba's AntV data visualization ecosystem, including timeago.js (1.5M weekly downloads), echarts-for-react, jest-canvas-mock, and others. The attack exploited the compromised `atool` npm account to publish malicious versions containing a heavily obfuscated JavaScript payload executed via Bun runtime. The payload scrapes GitHub Actions Runner.Worker process memory to extract masked CI/CD secrets in plaintext, harvests credentials from 130+ file paths (AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH keys, crypto wallets, AI tool configs), and exfiltrates data via a GitHub API dead-drop in the legitimate antvis/G2 repo and a fake OpenTelemetry C2 server at t.m-kosche.com. Over 2,500 public GitHub repositories have been created using stolen tokens, each named with Dune-universe terminology. The payload also drops persistent backdoors into Claude Code and VS Code configurations and injects malicious GitHub Actions workflows. Two delivery mechanisms were used: direct preinstall/postinstall hooks and a sophisticated optionalDependencies git reference to a poisoned commit. Affected users should immediately rotate all credentials, remove persistence artifacts, and pin to safe package versions.

17m read timeFrom stepsecurity.io
Post cover image
Table of contents
Compromised PakcagesRuntime Analysis with Harden-RunnerExfiltrated Secrets in Public RepositoriesBackground: The atool npm Account and the AntV EcosystemAttack TimelineTwo Delivery MechanismsAttack Flow DiagramPayload AnalysisIndicators of CompromiseAm I Affected?For the Community: Recovery StepsFor StepSecurity Enterprise Customers

Sort: