Claude Desktop silently installs a Native Messaging bridge (com.anthropic.claude_browser_extension.json) into seven Chromium-based browsers on macOS — including browsers not installed on the machine and browsers Anthropic's own documentation says are unsupported. The bridge pre-authorizes three Chrome extension IDs to spawn an out-of-sandbox helper binary with access to authenticated browser sessions, DOM state, form fields, and screen capture. The install happens without user consent, is re-written on every Claude Desktop launch, and is logged internally under 'Chrome Extension MCP'. The author argues this constitutes spyware, violates EU ePrivacy Directive Article 5(3), and potentially breaches computer misuse laws. Eleven specific dark patterns are documented with forensic evidence including file timestamps, MD5 hashes, macOS provenance attributes, and Claude's own log files.

19m read timeFrom thatprivacyguy.com
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What the bridge does when it is woken upFull audit reportDark patternsSecurity threats this createsPrivacy threats this createsIs it spyware?What Anthropic should have doneReferences
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